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Abstract: In this paper, we explore psychosis and schizophrenia as prototype disturbances, 
where mentalizing failures are widely seen. We attempt to describe how the process of 
rekindling mentalizing within attachment relationships (here, the patient-therapist relationship) 
can have a protective effect not just on the onset of the disturbance, but also when psychosis is 
already actively installed. We star by discussing mentalizing in training, practice and 
supervision. We also try to understand it contextually, as a relational concept, within the history 
of psychological therapies. 
 




Mentalizing is a generic psychological process activated when thinking about 
intentional mental states underpinning human actions. Scholarly work on the concept of 
mentalizing involves both theoretical elaborations of the mind-brain relationship, as well 
as empirically-based psychotherapeutic approaches to clinical work and supervision. 
Most importantly perhaps, the process of mentalizing in psychotherapy is fostered 
through a type of stance, attitude, or attentional set towards patients and clinical 
material. For this reason, we discuss mentalizing in training (section 2), practice and 
supervision (sections 3 and 4). Mentalizing is, par excellence, a relational concept 
which is usefully applied in clinical practice when understood contextually within the 
history of psychological therapies (Section 1). In the final sections, we explore 
psychosis and schizophrenia as prototype disturbances, where mentalizing failures are 
widely seen. We attempt to describe how the process of rekindling mentalizing within 
attachment relationships (here, the patient-therapist relationship) can have a protective 
 
 
effect not just on the onset of the disturbance, but also when psychosis is already 
actively installed.      
 
2. From One-Person Psychology to Two-Person Psychology  
Theories and practices of psychotherapy involve a number of different perspectives on 
the patient, as well as on the therapeutic relationship; it is perhaps the evolving view of 
the therapist’s role, from being an expert-observer to being an actor subject to 
intersubjective and interpersonal dynamics, that is most relevant to our overall attempt 
in transitioning from philosophical values to practical considerations in psychotherapy. 
We ask this question as a starting point: in clinical practice, what is the relevance of 
taking into account the person of the therapist? We will try to summarize how the 
person of the therapist became increasingly important in psychotherapy writings and 
practice. We will focus particularly on psychoanalysis as the starting point and ground 
for the contemporary landscape considering the critical role of the therapist in 
psychotherapeutic treatment.  
From a practical standpoint, the person of the therapist has always been important. It 
seems rather obvious to think that the personal values, personality and working style of 
the therapist are relevant to the process and outcome of therapy. However, 
psychoanalytic theory and literature have significantly evolved in the last 70-80 years 
with regards to the involvement of the therapist in the process of therapy as a 
participating self. Most authors now agree that these changes have represented 
paradigm shifts (Gilbert and Orlans, 2011). 
Briefly charting some of the main historical turning points in conceptions of the 
therapist’s role in treatment, we may start with Freud´s Drive Theory, where the role of 
the analyst was seen as bringing the patient’s unconscious memories and wishes to 
conscious awareness: “where id was ego shall be” (Freud, 1933). The mind was seen 
as an apparatus of contradictory forces and impulses, tensions and discharges, with 
biology playing a major role in motivating behaviour. From the beginning of 
experimental treatment using hypnosis to the creation and growth of the psychoanalytic 
cure, the role of the analyst was conceived as that of a detached scientist, trying to 
incur changes in the patient’s mind.  
The neutrality, anonymity and abstinence rules in Freud’s psychoanalytic method 
aimed to put at bay any influence coming from the person of the therapist, her/his 
 
 
personality, values and opinions. Most importantly perhaps, Freud perceived the 
affective stimulation provoked by the therapeutic encounter as something that could 
blur the analyst’s mind, and consequently negatively affect his work with patients. 
Given the intimate nature of the psychoanalytical work proposed by Freud, he was also 
keenly aware that enactments could potentially hurt the very enterprise of having 
psychoanalysis recognized as a valid form of treatment. In this context, Freud placed 
transference entirely in the patient’s mind, and advised rather rigidly that analysts keep 
aside any reactions they may have to the therapeutic encounter by adopting the 
traditionally distant, other-focused analytical stance. He was given to observe intense 
struggle, to put it lightly, in his colleagues who regularly broke the orthodox rules. 
It is now recognized by most streams in psychoanalysis that the orthodox stance is 
impossible, and that it might even contribute to enactments if the analyst’s experience 
is not included in the dynamics that call for analysis in a psychoanalytic treatment. 
Although the psychoanalytic developments that followed changed focus in keeping with 
general Freudian rules, a rich and creative debate emerged concerning the ubiquity of 
transference / countertransference phenomena, and how specific definitions of these 
concepts affect the analytic method. 
The concept of counter-transference, i.e. the therapist’s affective response when 
materiel brought by the patient activates the therapist’s unconscious, has gained 
legitimacy, transitioning from being characterized as unhelpful and something to avoid, 
to being perceived as fundamental tools in therapy (see Pereira, 2010 for a critique). 
We are now practicing psychotherapy in what is known as the full “relational turn” (e.g. 
Aron, 1996; Mitchel, 2000; Ghent, 1989) with the intersubjective and relational schools 
claiming the full presence of the therapist as an essential ingredient for change. 
Concepts from phenomenological and existential schools were integrated in 
psychoanalysis and terms such as spontaneity, authenticity, contextual meaning, 
attunement or relational field began to come to the forefront. A number of different 
contemporary schools of psychotherapy have become more sensitive to phenomena 
that stem from the concept of counter-transference, but that may be operationalized 
differently. What we wish to point out is how counter-transference phenomena are 
increasingly seen, by different brands of therapy, as a valid source of knowledge that, 
instead of burdening the therapist, may actually help in furthering intersubjective 
understanding of what is at play in therapy. Given that counter-transference responses 
have to do with the therapist “as a person”, we now discuss how personal values and 
assumptions in psychotherapy can also play a role in training and practice. 
 
 
3. Personal Values and Assumptions in Psychotherapy Training and Practice 
In contemporary psychotherapy training, most trainees are encouraged to review 
personal values and philosophical assumptions in order to understand their impact on 
patients and therapeutic work. While training encourages such a profound revision of 
one’s position to others and to the world, it is in the clinical struggle to understand and 
help patients, and particularly with patients suffering from psychosis, that this revision 
becomes nothing less than a necessity. 
Drawing on Sartre (1992), our therapeutic endeavour is to relate to others with respect, 
very much in relation to the inescapable responsibility of assuming one’s own actions 
and choices. If there is an enactment or a clear impasse in the therapeutic relationship 
we strive to reach enough humility to examine and take responsibility for our own 
contributions to the situation, and aim to remain available to explore the possible 
misunderstandings leading to the current relationship knot (Pereira, 2015). The 
profession of psychotherapy offers a tremendous opportunity to learn from experience, 
for both patient and therapist, in the context of that which is exchanged in a therapeutic 
relationship.    
From the point of view of the Mentalization Based Treatment (MBT) clinician, the 
foundations for curiosity about other people’s motivations, feelings and intentionality 
comes from the clinician’s own experience of having felt understood at times of 
relational impasse in their personal lives. Their own experience of having been met by 
someone else´s mind opens up to learning about self and other as an essential means 
for discovering the social world (see the concept of bio-social feedback in Fonagy et al, 
2002). Learning about self and other is an essential ingredient for discovering 
separateness, paving the practitioner´s way to value the patients’ autonomy and, even 
perhaps, taking pleasure in observing hidden potential being unravelled. This possible 
gratification, however, is not the aim but the result of a relational process where the 
therapist allows him/herself to be moved and impacted by the vicissitudes of the client 
and the therapeutic relationship. It is notably through being involved and sustaining the 
client’s involvement that the therapist can make herself/himself available to discover 
the client’s being (Heidegger, 1962).  
The genuine interest about the other can be referred to as non-voyeuristic curiosity. We 
recognize the complex nature of human beings by taking a position of humility and 
inquiry (Pereira, 2010). The therapeutic stance is one of not knowing, but interested in 
finding out; it is modelled on secure attachment behaviours between caregiver and 
 
 
infant (Fonagy et al, 2002). The interest of the caregiver in the child as a social agent 
with a mind promotes the development of epistemic trust (Fonagy and Alison, 2014), 
the special kind of trust that promotes the infant´s interest in acquiring knowledge from 
others and from the social world. Indeed, the infant is faced with an overwhelming 
wealth of sources of knowledge, and tends to trust the perspective brought by 
individuals who engage him/her as a meaningful agent. The attuned curiosity and 
interest manifested within the therapeutic encounter models this process that proceeds 
through a humble recognition of intersubjectivity and reciprocal mutual influence, 
instantiating a “psychological field formed by interacting worlds of experience” 
(Stolorow and Atwood, 1992, p. 3).  
In (good) relational psychotherapy training, humility is transversal, not only within 
relationships but also regarding interventions, modalities and schools. We are saying 
three things here: a) that no single model of psychotherapy can fully explain psychic 
phenomena, b) that each model, even “Grand Narratives” such as the Cognitive-
Behavioural Approach or Psychoanalysis, offer partial views of human beings, and c) 
that we sit in the position of negotiating within a multitude of diverse views. The MBT 
therapist is not interested in creating a new treatment modality but in finding out what 
works for the patient.  Quoting Badiou (1989, p84) “the announcement of the ‘End of 
the Grand Narratives’ is as immodest as the Grand Narrative itself”. 
Coming back to the issue of training, the psychotherapy trainee learns after the first 
years of exposure to the depth of the human psyche, that attempting to describe 
experience in neatly organized concepts is problematic. Language itself is an activity 
where words merge with one another in a fuzzy way (Wittgenstein, 1953). Whilst we 
see merit in many contemporary approaches, it is not uncommon to watch the 
polarization that each model creates when defending its own territory. This process 
leads to unnecessary dichotomisation and over-specification of therapeutic models 
(and this includes our own model, the mentalization-based model). A key point in 
maintaining the process of organizing experience while being affected by new 
experience and knowledge is to never forget that most things are fuzzy, opposed and 
tense, in the same way that language presents itself, and not dissimilar to the opacity 
of minds. In clinical training, we would thus support a dynamic and integrative, non-
dichotomized view of self and other, which most importantly needs to work through the 
therapist’s biases when experiencing intense emotional arousal that typically triggers 
interpretative patterns characterized by certainty (see non-mentalizing modes in 
Bateman, Fonagy and Luyten 2012). 
 
 
In advocating such a fundamental engagement to uncertainty, we also risk moving 
towards radical integrative and postmodern frameworks where truth itself is challenged. 
Although these positions are understandable, if taken to the extreme, they risk 
becoming closer to solipsism or even nihilism. Knowledge, in this way, would never be 
possible. We advocate that knowledge is possible but that it is dependent on a 
constructive process, and thus requires being constantly the subject of review, 
modification and challenge. 
In striving to be helpful to patients, one may find it useful to extend awareness of self 
and other to contextual awareness. One may assume the role of psychological 
therapist consciously, whilst also being aware of the unconscious dynamics that 
underlie the performing of roles (Goffman, 1959). Conscious psychotherapists are 
sensitive to (but not overburdened) the power inherent in assuming a role under the 
umbrella of official organizations (state hospitals, public trusts, etc.) and sheltered by 
professional bodies (Pereira, 2015). In a Foucauldian sense, therapists carry the 
power-knowledge of these institutions and the discourse of mental illness (Foucault, 
1972; 1975), and thus keen awareness of such contextual determinants may help to 
remove some of the obstacles to a better understanding of the patient’s subjective 
experience. 
 Drawing on philosophical values promoting the inherent co-dependency in learning the 
psyche within the context of psychotherapy, we outline how orienting the trainees’ 
minds to appreciate the opacity and complexity of mental states may assist in 
sustaining a psychotherapeutic process. A keen awareness of one’s position at various 
levels of the psychotherapeutic endeavour (intersubjective, interpersonal, social, socio-
historical) may safeguard against certainty, and help foster in the patient the sense of 
being understood, or more minimally perhaps, being the subject of another’s mind, 
which in development has been found to represent a key process in the rise of an 
autonomous, agentive self. Building on this transition from philosophy to psychology, 
we now focus more specifically on mentalization as a psychological process sustaining 
mental health.  
 
4. Mentalization: a relational, developmental, and integrative framework 
After having contextualized the importance of the relationship and of the therapist as a 
participating, reflective self, we will now focus on the concept of Mentalization. We 
briefly outline its relevance to psychopathology and clinical practice, and further focus 
 
 
on its relevance to psychosis and schizophrenia. So, what is mentalization or, as we 
prefer to say because it is an active process, mentalizing?  
Mentalizing can be defined in several different ways but we will start by stating what 
can be seen as the absence of mentalizing: mind-blindness. Baron-Cohen (1995) asks 
us, in referring to autism, to imagine what our world would be like if we were aware of 
physical things but were blind to the existence of mental things. He meant of course 
blind to things like thoughts, beliefs, knowledge, desires, and intentions, which for most 
of us self- evidently underlie behaviour. If the reader can imagine this for a moment, 
then she/he would have a glimpse of what mentalization is: implicitly and explicitly 
interpreting the actions of oneself and others as meaningful on the basis of intentional 
mental states (e.g. desires, needs, feelings, beliefs and reasons). This is just one way 
of defining mentalizing, which is also exemplified by other characterizations: to see 
ourselves from the outside and others from the inside; understanding 
misunderstanding; having mind in mind (binding heart and mind) (Allen, Fonagy and 
Bateman, 2008). The concept is also comparable to many others (Choi-Kain and 
Gunderson, 2008), such as empathy (mentalizing the other), mindfulness (mentalizing 
the self), social cognition (cognitive mentalizing), and metacognition (thinking about 
thinking), etc. 
Along the years, the psychoanalytic literature has proposed a number of conceptual 
cousins before mentalization was taken up by Pierre Marty and the French School of 
Psychosomatics. Freud’s Bindung, translated to English as binding or linking, was first 
formulated in the 1895’s ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’ as the mental activity of 
linking psychic instinctual energy in primary process with mental ‘representation’ in 
secondary process (Freud, 1895). Reformulated along the years, this concept referred 
to the transformation of somatic non-mental activity into something mental, through the 
creation and adaptation of networks of thoughts that can metabolize mental pathogens 
such as developmental stress, loss, personal challenges and help defuse the toxicity of 
trauma.  
Initially, Freud (1914) stressed that the representation of internal states could fail in 
various ways, which somewhat resonates with what is meant nowadays by mentalizing 
impairments. Other concepts, such as Melanie Klein’s depressive position (Klein, 1945) 
or Wilfred Bion’s (1962) alpha-function are consistent with the mentalizing process 
(Fonagy et al, 2002). For authors from the clinical domain, the construct of mentalizing 
rests upon the psychoanalytic insight which permeates virtually all schools of 
psychoanalysis, proposing that the mother-child relationship provides both the space 
 
 
and the process through which the development capacity to symbolize can emerge. 
For example, the consolidation of the true self in Winnicott (1962) or the acquisition of 
empathy in Kohut (1977), are clearly dependent on the caregiver’s psychological 
understanding of the infant. Winnicott (1962) also recognized, alongside Kohut (1977) 
and Fairbairn (1952) that the psychological self develops through the perception of 
oneself in another person’s mind as thinking and feeling (Fonagy et al, 2002). 
In the 1960s, French psychoanalysts employed the concept of mentalization to 
understand psychosomatic patients who displayed a lack of symbolization of somatic 
states (Marty, 1968; 1991). The construct of alexithymia has also demonstrated some 
overlap with aspects of mentalizing, specifically relating to self-awareness (Goerlich et 
al, in preparation). Fonagy (1991: p.641) introduced mentalization into Anglophone 
psychoanalytic discourse by defining it as ‘the capacity to conceive of conscious and 
unconscious mental states in oneself and others’. The contemporary clinical application 
of mentalization has been developed in great part by Fonagy and colleagues at the 
University College London (UCL) and the Anna Freud Centre. The group’s current 
conceptualization of mentalization combines insights and ideas derived from (Jurist, 
Slade and Bergner, 2008): 
– (a) attachment theory and research about the properties of early (and 
potentially also later therapeutic) relationships that promote, or hinder, 
the capacity for mentalization; 
– (b) Developmental psychology and philosophy;  
– (c) Contemporary neuroscientific research about the brain and the link 
between brain and mind, as well as about the way early relationships 
affect development;  
– (d) Psychoanalysis, and in particular the application of W.R. Bion’s 
writings on learning from experience. 
Within the above principles, Bateman and Fonagy (2004; 2006) have developed a 
treatment programme for Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), a condition intimately 
linked with attachment difficulties, affect dysregulation and mentalizing failures. This 
treatment programme was given the name Mentalization-Based Treatment, currently 




5. Mentalizing as a resilience-inducing process 
A considerable amount of enthusiasm has propelled clinicians and clinical scientists 
trained in the MBT model for BPD to apply and adapt their model to other diagnostic 
categories, such as antisocial personality disorder (ASPD; Bateman et al, 2016), eating 
disorders (Jewell et al, 2015), functional somatic disorders (Luyten et al, 2012) and 
other disorders (Bateman and Fonagy, 2012). Psychotic disorders (Weijers et al, 2016; 
Brent, 2009) and their preceding clinical high-risk states (Debbané et al, 2016; 
Debbané et al, 2016a) have also been proposed as potential therapeutic targets for 
which mentalization-based treatment may yield therapeutic effects. Most of these 
adaptations still require significant research to uphold the promise they offer, and their 
veritable clinical utility will be a subject of inquiry for the coming decade. The reason 
why MBT may be adaptable to different disorders is rather simple: mentalizing is 
conceptualized as a protective factor mitigating the negative effects of risk factors such 
as interpersonal stress, but also the consequences of psychopathological 
manifestations. Mentalization thus intervenes at different stages of illness from early 
risk states to full-blown clinical states (Debbané et al, 2016). An important point to 
remember is that mentalizing is not conceived as an aetiological factor leading to the 
onset of psychiatric disorders, but rather a protective resilience-inducing process that 
individuals at high-risk, or clinically-ill individuals, may more adaptively employ to 
attenuate risk and/or temper the interpersonal and functional costs of psychopathology.  
How then does a process such as mentalizing provide a protective effect to 
psychopathology? The current working hypothesis stipulates that higher order cognition 
processes (HOC; Rudrauf, 2014; Fonagy & Bateman, 2016; Debbané et al, 2016), 
those imaginative processes that sustain thinking about self and others, mentalizing 
oneself in relation to others and the world, and perspective-taking encompassing past, 
present and future, provide the plasticity and flexibility that prevent thinking patterns 
from crystallizing into pathological, rigid forms of relating to oneself and others. 
Hypothetically, mentalizing may be relevant in high-risk or prodromal states of 
psychopathology because it guards the individual from the establishment of circular, 
impoverishing, and self-reinforcing pathological thinking processes. Importantly, 
mentalizing is a process that is sustained not only within one’s relationship to oneself 
(self-reflection), but perhaps more importantly through communication with meaningful 
others. In this way mentalizing is both developmentally dependent upon the quality of 
early attachment relationships, as well as upon secondary attachments which are 
crucial to life transitions and coping with life stress. Mentalizing relationships breeds 
 
 
trust and faith in relationships, and contributes to seeing others as potentially bringing 
novel, complementary and meaningful perspectives to one’s own views. This process, 
which is active both at the intersubjective and interpersonal level, prevents the 
individual from succumbing to circular, often binary, rigid patterns of thoughts 
characteristic of psychopathological states. In situations where psychopathology has 
set in, the progressive rekindling of mentalizing through therapeutic encounters and the 
amelioration of communication with significant others can yield positive effects and help 
the suffering individual to gain more consistent access to resources available in the 
therapeutic environment and beyond, namely in her/his interpersonal and social 
networks. Below, we will specify how this hypothesis may be specifically articulated 
around risk for psychosis and psychotherapy along the psychosis spectrum. 
 
6. Mentalization-Based Practice along the Psychosis Continuum 
A first conceptualization for an MBT framework to psychosis was introduced by Brent 
and Fonagy (2014). The authors proposed a developmental model wherein early 
attachment disturbances play a role early in the unfolding of psychosis vulnerability. 
These attachment disturbances may originate from different sources. Firstly, 
environmental factors such as child abuse and neglect (Read and Gumley, 2010) may 
yield insecure or disorganized attachment which makes the child more prone to employ 
dissociative coping mechanisms in the face of high emotional arousal, and to 
potentially deactivate attachment needs; both phenomena are thought to impact the 
early hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenergic (HPA) function, as well as thwart the 
oxytonergic systems sustaining synchrony in early attachment relationships. 
Additionally, both these environmentally-induced vulnerabilities can impact the 
dopaminergic reward system, and potentially affect the integrity of the salience system 
as the child and adolescent develops and acquires the rudimentary social cognitive 
skills required to navigate in the social world.  
Of course, environmental risk factors necessarily interact with genetically endowed 
vulnerability to develop psychotic spectrum disorders. To clarify, we are not advocating 
that attachment insecurity causes schizophrenia, but rather, that genetic risk for 
psychosis unfolds by developmental transactions with social learning as well as 
epigenetic cycles. Here, the construct of schizotypy is useful in that it provides a 
developmental model that integrates genetic-environment transactional processes. 
Schizotypy is commonly understood as a personality trait which reflects a type of 
 
 
nervous system functioning that prototypically sustains the expression of cognitive 
disorganization, perceptual aberrations, as well as affective and interpersonal 
impairments. It reflects an underlying genetic vulnerability to develop psychotic 
disorders, although the genetics, neurobiology, and neurophysiology components are 
not yet understood. Whether from a taxonic or dimensional point of view, vulnerability 
to develop psychosis unfolds “hand in hand” with environmental risk factors, and only a 
fraction of individuals at-risk go on to develop psychotic disorders. Our point is to 
conceive of how the development and use of mentalizing may participate in preventing 
individuals from becoming clinically ill, and in those with a diagnosed disorder, how 
mentalizing could help mitigate the adverse effects of psychopathology.  
 
7. Mentalizing at Different Stages of Unfolding Psychosis 
The emergence of psychotic disorders is commonly thought to proceed in 4 stages. In 
the first premorbid stage, usually occurring from early development until late 
adolescence, special attention is paid to sub-clinical soft-signs of psychosis proneness 
in the neurological and neuromotor domains, as well as clinically in terms of schizotypal 
manifestations in the interpersonal, perceptual and cognitive domains. More recently, 
some studies have attempted to draw links between these manifestations and the 
development of mentalizing skills. A number of studies (reviewed in Debbané et al, 
2016) have highlighted subtle but apparent mentalizing impairment in domains such as 
reality monitoring (Debbané et al, 2009; 2010) and theory of mind (Clemmensen et al, 
2014; 2016). Interestingly, the adequate development of social cognitive skills, such as 
theory of mind, seems to be associated with the natural disappearance of early 
psychotic signs such as auditory verbal hallucinations (Barthels-Velthuis et al. 2011).  
Later in adulthood, individuals who hear voices (voice hearers), but who do not suffer 
from or meet criteria for a psychotic disorder, demonstrate superior mindfulness skills 
in comparison with both clinically ill voice hearers and healthy controls (Peters et al, 
2016). Although a sufficient amount of longitudinal data is still lacking, the available 
results are consistent with a resilience-inducing model of social cognitive processes 
that sustain the understanding of oneself and others as driven by intentional mental 
states. This warrants the establishment of primary prevention strategies sustaining the 




The second stage in the emergence of psychotic disorders has been revealed by 
longitudinal studies following prodromal or ultra high-risk adolescents and young adults 
(Yung et al, 2005), with the aim to chart the prevalence of those who evolve to a first 
episode of psychosis. These individuals suffer from symptoms just below the threshold 
of clinical relevance (ultra high risk symptoms), or symptoms of perceptual or cognitive 
disorganization (basic symptoms; Schultze-Lutter and Koch, 2010) that are usually 
associated with a moderate degree of functional decline. It is thought that around 30% 
of individuals presenting such clinical high risk (CHR) go on to develop a full blown 
psychotic disorder (Nelson et al, 2013). Social cognitive impairments have been 
observed in this population, although it is still unclear if these impairments are related 
to their conversion towards psychosis. A longitudinal study investigating ToM in a 
group of 49 subjects at CHR for psychosis observed that CHR individuals who 
transitioned to psychosis displayed worse baseline scores on ToM tasks compared 
with non-converters (Kim et al, 2011). Moreover, the authors reported that a model 
combining both ToM and neurocognitive scores significantly predicted the time of 
transition to formal psychosis. Another recent study partly confirmed these results. 
Piskulic et al (2016) observed that a large CHR group (n = 764) displayed significantly 
worse performance in various domains of social cognition (ToM, social perception, 
facial emotion perception) compared to healthy controls (n = 280), yet no significant 
group differences emerged in any of the social cognitive domains between CHR 
individuals who transitioned to psychosis and their non-converting counterparts 
(Piskulic et al, 2016). Still, improvements in social cognition over time (one year follow-
up) were more prominent in CHR non-converters and healthy controls compared to 
CHR converters.  
In clinical states of first-episode psychosis, schizotypal personality disorder, or 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders, the evidence for social cognitive impairments is 
abundant (Green, Horan and Lee, 2015). A number of studies have reported 
impairments in mentalizing (Debbané et al, 2016a), metacognition (Lysaker, 2014), 
insight (Lysaker, 2014a), and other higher order cognitive processes (HOC). 
Importantly, these studies emphasize the relationship between HOC and social 
adaptive functioning in clinical states. Currently, metacognitive therapy for psychosis 
provides a model that suggests targeting reflective processes about self and others to 
remediate social cognitive dysfunction in psychotic disorders (Van Donkersgoed, 
2014). Similarly, cognitive remediation strategies attempt to rescue social cognitive 
dysfunction which is thought to represent the principle obstacle for recovering a social 
functional role in individuals with recurring and chronic forms of psychotic illnesses.  All 
 
 
these therapeutic strategies, we think, work with HOC because it is through these 
processes that the plasticity of mental functioning can be herded to restructure 
ingrained thinking patterns into less rigid intersubjective and interpersonal interpretative 
schemas. In other words, through the reconfiguration of a more flexible network of 
beliefs about oneself, together with the rekindling of interest in interpersonal and social 
relationships, patients may partly recover the tools necessary to regulate themselves 
within the sometimes overwhelming torments of interpersonal relationships.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Starting from our own experience in the clinical encounter and drawing on training, 
practice and research in the field of psychotherapy and psychosis, a number of 
conclusions may be tentatively offered: a) a secure experience of attachment with the 
caregiver(s) is paramount for the development of mentalizing, and may be protective 
against the effects of environmental risk factors, including trauma; b) effective 
therapists find it useful to reflect on their own experiences of attachment, and to be 
able to mentalize and create secure attachments with patients; c) being insecurely 
attached to care-givers and frequent exposure to relational stress are (two of many) 
vulnerability factors for psychosis; d) in this context, early screening and detection of 
high-risk states for psychosis are paramount for sustaining the development of flexible 
social cognitive processes; e) MBT may represent an effective tool in preventing the 
development of full blown psychosis through a resilience inducing process, although 
this needs to be tested empirically.   
The development of psychotic disorders is a dynamic and multi-determined process. 
Despite the importance of genes (Arnedo et al, 2015) it is in the interaction between 
them and the environment that the disorder can progress. Investing in primary 
prevention programs could significantly reduce the burden of mental health problems. 
Work with infants, vulnerable mothers and adolescents at risk is needed to test the 
capacity of resilience-inducing mechanisms such as mentalizing to reduce the burden 
incurred by psychosis. Clinically, a sustained reflective stance facilitated by humble, 
curious, reflexive and attuned practitioners may critically contribute to ameliorating 
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